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In this paper I intend to define some underlying features 
of Dewey's pragmatist aesthetics, distinguishing his own 
approach to this discipline from that of others. The very 
title of the paper – John Dewey's aesthetics – creates 
some embarrassment. For at least two and a half 
centuries we have been accustomed to think of 
aesthetics as a specific philosophical discipline, which is 
mainly characterized by exclusion. Aesthetics has been 
defined as sensitive cognition in opposition to 
intellectual knowledge, as subjective or intersubjective 
judgement, unable to capture any objective knowledge, 
as philosophy of art in contrast to the philosophy of 
nature, and as the contemplation of pure forms, 
detached from any practical interest. Above all, the birth 
of aesthetics as a specific discipline in Western culture 
has historically been linked to the affirmation in Europe 
and then in North America of a unitary system of the 
arts, i.e. to the emergence of a substantive idea of Art as 
a singular noun with a capital A, a process intimately 
related to the radical affirmation of the autonomy of 
artistic pursuits vis-à-vis other human activities.1 
 
Therefore, we should at least try to limit this 
embarrassment by speaking of inclusive aesthetics in 
Dewey’s case. I use the expression ‘inclusive’ because on 
the one hand the chief aim of this aesthetics is to find 
the aesthetic in experience, by both rooting it in the 
structural biological dependence of human organisms 
upon the natural and social environment of which they 
are part, and by seeking to recover the aesthetic aspects 
originally underlying our ordinary practices. From this 
perspective, Dewey's approach is characterized by two 
                                                 
1 See P.O. Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A 
Study in the History of Aesthetics, Part I”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 12/4 (1951), pp 496-527 and “The 
Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of 
Aesthetics, Part II”, 13/1 (1952), pp 17-46. 
interrelated principles: “cultural naturalism” and ethical 
and political critical implications. On the other hand, 
Dewey proposes a broad concept of art, since this is 
understood as every “mode of activity that is charged 
with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed 
possession”.2 
 
However, it would be too time-consuming to deal with 
these subjects in the present paper,3 where I think it will 
be more fruitful to limit the inquiry by focusing on three 
expressions. It seems to me that they help define some 
specific aspects of pragmatism, distinguishing it from 
other philosophic traditions. These three words are 
more or less widely used and discussed in recent and 
contemporary philosophical debate, but Dewey used 
them to pursue very different goals from those 
prevailing in other philosophic reflections. 
 
The first expression, which has been made the subject of 
a wider debate, is that of ‘aesthetic experience’. I am 
going to argue that this expression is primarily used by 
the American philosopher in order to challenge the 
compartimentalization of works of art and their 
separation from our ordinary lives and to affirm the 
primary aesthetic connotations of our experiences. In 
Dewey’s thought this formula appears to be used in a 
very different way from in either continental research on 
aesthetic autonomy or unsuccessful analytical attempts 
to define art. 
 
The second expression, ‘aesthetic qualities’, has been 
broadly discussed in analytical aesthetics, but almost no 
attempts have been made to compare the term with 
Dewey’s proposals.4 Dewey's thesis is that we have to 
assume that qualitative aspects are basically part of our 
                                                 
2 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, Volume 1:1925 of 
The Later Works, 1925-1953 (Southern Illinois University 
Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1988), p. 269. 
3 I discussed these aspects of Dewey’s thought in: Fuori 
dalla torre d’avorio. L’estetica inclusiva di John Dewey 
oggi (Marietti 1821, Genova-Milano, 2012). 
4 Except for some observations in: H. Putnam, The 
Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (Columbia U.P., 
New York, 1999). 
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common experiences, that they are modes of meaning 
of our environment and cannot be reduced to subjective 
phenomena or be restricted within special 
compartments. 
 
The third expression, ‘consummation’ or ‘consummatory 
experience’, is actually connected to a wider lexical 
constellation, which includes ‘enjoyment’, ‘satisfaction’ 
and ‘fulfilment’. Dewey’s pragmatic approach is based 
on the recognition of our aesthetic needs, as conceived 
from a quasi-anthropological perspective; in this regard 
it differs substantially from the exclusively negative 
approach to art characterizing Adorno’s critical theory. If 
aesthetic aspects have been removed from our ordinary 
experience, the arts cannot limit themselves to negating 
the present unequal and impoverishing conditions, but 
must pose the problem of finding alternative ways for 
improving our lives and for making our experience of the 
shared world more fruitful and satisfying for everyone. 
 
1. What is ‘aesthetic experience’ for? 
 
Let us begin from the first formula, which is ‘aesthetic 
experience’. I shall start by arguing that, if we wish to 
understand what Dewey meant when talking of 
‘aesthetic experience’ or, better, of those aesthetic 
aspects that are inherent in our experiences, we must 
not refer to Monroe Beardsley’s definition. Rather, we 
should turn again to George Mead’s interpretation, 
which may be found in a brief but significant essay 
published in 1926, “The Nature of Aesthetic Experience”, 
a text that was written under the explicit influence of 
Dewey’s Experience and Nature.5 
The problem with Beardsley’s approach is that he 
                                                 
5 See G.H. Mead, “The Nature of Aesthetic Experience”, 
International Journal of Ethics, 36/4 (1926), pp 382-393 
and M.C. Beardsley, “Aesthetic Experience Regained”, 
The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism, 28/1 (1969), 
pp 3-11, M.C. Beardsley, Aesthetics. Problems in the 
Philosophy of Criticism (Hackett P.C., Inc.,, Indianapolis-
Cambridge, 1981), in particular § 28, “The 
Instrumentalist Theory”, pp 524-543. 
actually used some indications proposed by Dewey in Art 
as Experience in order to define an alleged “aesthetic 
value”. But in Dewey’s book these traits are meant to 
characterize what he called “an experience”, that is an 
interaction that is marked out from most comings and 
goings of our environmental exchanges; it may be 
eminently artistic or peculiarly aesthetic, but it refers 
more generally to every kind of experience which comes 
to its consummation. Beardley’s displacement may be 
understood as an answer to the central problem of 
defining the concept of art, which became a pressing 
issue with Morris Weitz’s famous article exploring the 
possibility of defining art after Wittgenstein, given some 
of the implications of his Philosophical Investigations.6 
 
Beardsley adopts a general pragmatist point of view, 
that is an instrumentalist perspective with regard to the 
problem of understanding “what it would mean to say 
that something is a good aesthetic object, and how this 
could be shown to be true”.7 According to him, in order 
to answer this question we should focus on the peculiar 
kind of function an aesthetic object can perform that is 
on its capacity to engender an aesthetic experience. 
Indeed, in Beardsley's opinion the common feature 
characterizing the class of objects we call works of art 
would consist precisely in their ability to generate an 
aesthetic experience. 
 
In order then to explain what such a peculiar experience 
might consist in, Beardsley expressly refers to Dewey 
(surprisingly comparing him with Kant), by recovering 
some of the underlying features which according to the 
American pragmatist characterize a complete 
experience, making it stand out from the continuous, 
habitual and often inconclusive flow of our interactions 
with the environment. 
                                                 
6 See M. Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics”, The 
Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism, 15/1 (1956), pp 
27-35. 
7 M.C. Beardsley, Aesthetics. Problems in the Philosophy 
of Criticism, p. 524. 
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In this move from every experience, which can be 
identified as “an experience” to specifically artistic 
experiences, a number of restrictions come into play. 
The phenomenological relevance of a given experience 
and a person’s awareness of how it stands out in his or 
her own memory or imagination are envisaged in terms 
of the peculiar attention elicited by a piece of art 
capturing one's aesthetic attention or causing an 
aesthetic experience. The vital intensification or 
enhancement of meaningful exchanges with the 
environment turns into the intensity of an artistic 
experience or into the peculiar kind of concentration 
inspired by works of art. The unitary and consummatory 
features of an experience change into the hallmark of 
that peculiar experience generated by a work of art, 
capable of producing its differentiation from other 
experiences: “The experience detaches itself, and even 
insulates itself, from the intrusion of alien elements”.8 
 
But as Richard Shusterman has argued,9 Dewey’s 
intention was not to distinguish art objects and the 
aesthetic experiences they generate from other kinds of 
things and other sorts of human practices. Using some of 
Dewey’s ideas in order to define aesthetic experience 
and artistic objects means using a blunt weapon, an 
unsuitable tool that has been more or less rightly 
criticized on several fronts.10  
 
On the contrary, the concern guiding Dewey’s 
investigation is simply the continuity thesis, which is 
probably so familiar as to appear almost naïve, namely 
the thesis that you cannot understand orogenesis unless 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 528. 
9 R. Shusterman, “The End of Aesthetic Experience”, The 
Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism, 55/1 (1997), pp 
29-41. 
10 See G. Dickie, “Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic 
Experience”, The Journal of Philosophy, 62/5 (1965), pp 
129-136 and N. Carrol, “Aesthetic Experience Revisited”, 
British Journal of Aesthetics, 42/2 (2002), pp 145-168, 
N. Carroll, Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge U.P., 
Cambridge, 2001), esp. the chapter “Four Concept of 
Aesthetic Experience”.  
you start by investigating mountains rooted in the 
earth's crust, of which they are an integral part. In other 
words, you cannot understand those “refined and 
intensified forms of experience that are works of art” 
unless you start from “everyday events, doings and 
sufferings, that are universally recognized to constitute 
experience”.11 But the peculiarity of Dewey’s approach is 
not merely the fact that this continuity is based on the 
“biological obviousness” of human organisms’ structural 
dependence upon the natural and social environment of 
which they are basic parts. The point is that his leading 
scientific questions converge with ethical and political 
ones. Why did so-called works of art turn into “ethereal 
things” that are separated from everyday practices and 
constitute the privileged possession or enjoyment of a 
few? Why do we consider it an obvious fact that there is 
no enjoyment in work, but that it must essentially 
coincide with exertion? Why do we also assume that 
satisfaction in a well-done work must remain alien to the 
logic of scientific research, for otherwise the work would 
risk losing its seriousness? Are we to give up in the face 
of the compartmentalization of artworks and their 
confinement to special places and times, or can we 
imagine more satisfying forms of engagement with our 
world? How can we contribute to enhancing our 
personal and shared experience? 
 
Mead focuses his attention on just this kind of issue, 
stressing an intentionally broad and hopefully pervasive 
conception of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic aspects or 
phases of our ordinary experiences relate to the ability 
to enjoy things immediately, to appreciate what we are 
doing by avoiding solely focusing on the ends we are 
pursuing, in such a way as to enjoy (or suffer, I might 
add) only the experience constituting a particular 
practice and the situation in which it occurs – that is by 
enjoying, according to Mead’s interpretation, the means 
                                                 
11 J. Dewey, Art as Experience, Volume 10:1934 of The 
Later Works, 1925-1953 (Southern Illinois University 
Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1989), p. 9. 
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themselves instead of merely using them instrumentally, 
while being in fact completely absorbed by the results 
we have to achieve. Aesthetic appreciation, therefore, 
does not concern a particular class of objects, but the 
aptitude to let enjoyed meaning be a part of everyone’s 
life.12 In aesthetic appreciation we do not almost blindly 
pursue an end, regardless of the means used, but rather 
enjoy what we are doing; we stop in order to appreciate 
and contemplate what we are doing and undergoing, 
says Mead. But it is quite clear that the contemplation 
he is speaking of is not a disinterested gaze, turned to a 
particular set of objects. It is rather an ability to enjoy 
human activities as such. 
 
Besides, in his characterization of aesthetic experience 
as consummatory experience Mead remained faithful to 
Dewey. The isolated individual is not a natural fact. He or 
she is the result of the competitive conditions of 
industrial society, and this is also true of the separation 
of enjoyment from work, which reduces the latter to 
mere exertion. In the actual situation where the division 
of labour has become an obvious given, it seems natural 
that the fruits of labour can only be enjoyed by a 
privileged few. But if we recover the basic biological idea 
that human interdependence is structural, i.e. that it is 
linked to the largely deficient constitution of our 
organism – as stated in Human Nature and Conduct13 – 
then it is evident that “shared experience is the greatest 
of human goods” and that enjoying it is a way to 
enhance the experience of life itself. 
 
From this point of view the aesthetic attitude appears a 
basic and healthy attitude, of which the so-called fine 
arts constitute a development, a refinement. But while 
the aesthetic attitude in contemporary society has been 
turned into a separate field and removed from other 
                                                 
12 G.H. Mead, The Nature of Aesthetic Experience, cit., p. 
384. 
13 J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Volume 14 of 
The Middle Works, 1899-1924 (Southern Illinois 
University Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1988). 
human practices, “the thirst of enjoyment is still 
there”:14 hence, it will look elsewhere for other possible 
satisfaction. In this perspective, the celebration of great 
artists can become a mere compensatory enjoyment for 
the absence of consummatory experiences in our 
ordinary life. 
 
It is true, however, that in Art as Experience, which Mead 
could not have read when writing his article, Dewey 
poses the problem of distinguishing, albeit within the 
context of a basic continuity, between what is eminently 
artistic and the aesthetic, understood as a “primary 
phase in experience”. Dewey reaches a solution by 
drawing upon the concept of having an experience that 
stands out in comparison to our usual and often 
inconclusive comings and goings with the world. But it is 
an answer that is explicitly based on differences of 
degree. It is certainly an unsuccessful solution if it is 
intended to draw a definite distinction between art and 
non-art, because it admittedly also applies to reading a 
novel, to confident participation in an election campaign, 
to a dinner with an old friend or to quarrelling with one’s 
lover.15 
 
But the point is still that Dewey does not wish simply to 
describe a state of affairs. He is much more interested in 
the question of what can we do, even on a philosophical 
level:  
 
… it is safe to say that a philosophy of art is 
sterilized unless it makes us aware of the 
function of art in relation to other modes of 
experience, and unless it indicates why this 
function is so inadequately realized, and unless it 
suggests the conditions under which the office 
would be successfully performed.16 
 
                                                 
14 G.H. Mead, The Nature of Aesthetic Experience, cit., p. 
387. 
15 See J. Kaminsky, “Dewey’s Concept of an Experience”, 
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17/3 
(1957), pp 316-330 and D.C. Mathur, “A Note on the 
Concept of “Consummatory Experience” in Dewey's 
Aesthetics, 63/9 (1966), pp 225-231. 
16 J. Dewey, Art as Experience, cit., p. 17. 
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In my opinion this is the one aspect really qualifying 
Dewey’s ‘pragmatic’ aesthetics. In this perspective it 
appears fully consistent with Pierce's thesis that the 
intellectual scope or the meaning of a theory must be 
measured against the effects that it is able to achieve in 
our life conduct.17 
 
II. On aesthetic qualities 
 
I am going to say some words now about ‘aesthetic 
qualities’, a term that significantly already appears 
before Art as Experience in Experience and Nature, 
where it plays a basic role in Dewey’s conception of 
experience. On the other hand, the analytical discussion 
on the alleged aesthetic qualities was extensive and 
articulated and led to the introduction of the notion of 
aesthetic supervenience or emergentism. The major 
contributions here are those first by Frank Sibley and 
later by Jerrold Levinson.18 
 
In a preliminary survey of this debate, the issues at stake 
ambiguously appear sometimes to relate to the same 
things and sometimes not. What I mean is that both 
Dewey and the two aforementioned authors often 
propose a number of adjectives to illustrate what is 
meant by aesthetic qualities, in the absence of criteria of 
definition; most significantly, their proposed lists appear 
                                                 
17 See J.P. Cometti, Qu’est-ce que le pragmatisme? 
(Gallimard, Paris, 2010), p. 18. Thomas Alexander has 
expressed some doubts as to whether Dewey’s 
aesthetics may be defined as ‘pragmatist’, because of 
the limited presence of this formula in Art as Experience.  
18 See F. Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts”, in The 
Philosophical Review, 68/4 (1959), pp 421-450, F. Sibley, 
“Aesthetics and Nonaesthetics”, in The Philosophical 
Review, 74/2 (1965), pp 135-159, J. Levinson, “Aesthetic 
Supervenience”, in Music, Art & Metaphysics. Essays in 
Philosophical Aesthetics (Oxford UP, Oxford-New-York, 
2011), pp 134-158, J. Levinson, “Being Realistic about 
Aesthetic Properties”, in The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, 52/3, 1994, pp 351-354, J. Levinson, 
“Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, and Difference 
of Sensibility”, in E. Brady, J. Levinson (ed.), Aesthetic 
Concepts: Essays After Sibley, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
2001, pp 61-80. 
partially analogous. Dewey states that in our continuous 
relations with our environment, things are naturally 
perceived as “poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, 
settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, 
consoling, splendid, fearful”.19 In “Being Realistic About 
Aesthetic Properties” Levinson provides a varied list of 
aesthetic attributes, which he distinguishes according to 
their greater or lesser evaluative force. These adjectives 
range from “striking, splendid, excellent, miserable” to 
“balanced, chaotic, unified” and “melancholy, 
anguished, cheerful” and “graceful, gaudy, garish”.20 
 
It is evident, however, that while for the American 
pragmatist the point was to detect a basic structure 
behind our interactions with the environment on which 
we depend, and, I would add, a basic trait of the 
common language in which we move, Sibley's and 
Levinson's main field of investigation is the art critic's 
vocabulary. Besides, their most important problem is 
that which underlies our modern aesthetic tradition, 
namely the possibility or impossibility of justifying our 
judgements about works of art, and of finding any 
realistic or subjective bases for supporting them. I 
nonetheless wish to argue that Dewey's reflections can 
be useful not in resolving difficulties in the analytical 
debate, but in resetting the terms of the debate itself. 
 
In what follows, I shall broadly summarize some basic 
elements of the analytical debate on aesthetic qualities. 
 
1. First of all, both authors present what should be 
meant by aesthetic concepts, qualities, judgements or 
expressions (Sibley) or by aesthetic attributes and 
properties (Levinson) by means of lists of examples such 
as those mentioned above. Whereas Levinson declares 
he is not addressing the question of “what counts as an 
                                                 
19 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, cit., p. 82. 
20 J. Levinson, “Being Realistic about Aesthetic 
Properties”, pp 351-352. 
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aesthetic attribute”21, Sibley states that it is not possible 
to define this rigorously, adding that he believes there is 
“no need to defend the distinction”.22 According to him 
it is quite clear from our use of these kinds of words that 
when we say that something is “large, circular, green, 
slow, or monosyllabic”, we are not formulating aesthetic 
judgements, while when we say that something is 
“graceful, dainty, or garish, or that a work of art is 
balanced, moving, or powerful” we are indeed doing so. 
The qualities that are expressed in this second set of 
cases would imply “an exercise of aesthetic sensitivity or 
perceptiveness”, an exercise in taste. Non-aesthetic 
judgements are based on “natural, observable, 
perceptual, physical, objective and neutral” qualities.23  
 
2. Both authors note these sorts of words are rather 
common in ordinary language too, but this kind of 
occurrence is clearly not the object of their scholarly 
interest. Levinson, in particular, considers these sorts of 
attributes in everyday conversation to be ambiguous, 
because both descriptive and evaluative aspects are 
typically intertwined with them.24 
 
3. Sibley argues that there is a dependency relationship 
between aesthetic and non-aesthetic qualities or that 
the former emerge out of the latter. “Emergence” here 
means that while there are “non-aesthetic features 
which serve as conditions for applying aesthetic 
terms”25, they cannot be considered as necessary and 
sufficient conditions. When I try to justify the judgment 
that a certain sculptural work is harmonious because it 
presents a good integration of full and empty spaces, the 
relationship between harmony and the integration of 
solids and voids is not a necessary and sufficient 
                                                 
21 J. Levinson, “Aesthetic Supervenience”, cit., p. 134. 
22 F. Sibley, “Aesthetics and Nonaesthetics”, cit., p. 135. 
23 Frank Sibley strongly supported this thesis, even 
though he explicitly stated his dissatisfaction with all 
terms used to illustrate the distinction he aims to point 
at. See F. Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts, cit., p. 421.  
24 See point 4 below.. 
25 F. Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts”, cit., p. 424. 
condition, but only a characteristic or typical one. In 
other words, there is no predetermined rule for 
correlating an aesthetic aspect to a non-aesthetic one. 
 
Levinson’s basic thesis is that “the aesthetic attributes of 
an object are supervenient on its nonaesthetic ones”26, 
in the sense that the non-aesthetic properties of an 
object would not even provide any negative conditions 
for the government of aesthetic properties. Therefore 
aesthetic properties are in no way reducible to 
subvenient properties, that is to perceptive ones, or to 
subperceptive, microphysical ones. 
 
4. Levinson argues that aesthetic qualities are not 
inherently evaluative, or at least that it is always possible 
to distinguish a descriptive component from any 
attached evaluative connotations of the term, so that we 
can talk about aesthetic terms that are valuation-added. 
On this basis, Levinson later argued that aesthetic 
attributes should be understood realistically as 
properties possessed by objects that are judged 
“striking”, “splendid”, or “chaotic”.27 They are not to be 
interpreted idealistically, as if the judging subject were 
projecting subjective attributions on what he is judging. 
 
Dewey’s approach is very different and may possibly 
appear surprising given its context. At the risk 
oversimplifying things, I will try to identify some traits by 
distinguishing this new context from the previous one. I 
will focus my attention on Experience and Nature and Art 
as Experience.28 
 
First of all, it must be said that when Dewey speaks 
about aesthetic qualities, he is talking about experience 
in general, that is about continuous exchanges taking 
                                                 
26 J. Levinson, “Aesthetic Supervenience”, cit., p. 134. 
27 See in particular J. Levinson, “Being Realistic about 
Aesthetic Properties”, cit. 
28 Two particularly incisive passages can be found in J. 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, cit., p. 82 and in 
J. Dewey, Art as Experience, cit., pp 21-22. 
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place between human organisms and the natural and 
social environment on which their survival depends at all 
levels.29 Obviously, he is not only talking about specific 
artistic practices or the vocabulary adopted by the art 
critic, but also about careful observers. At this level 
aesthetic qualities are clearly primary or basic, not 
supervenient on supposed merely perceptual or purely 
physical properties. Because our survival radically 
depends on the environment we belong to, including 
other individuals from whom we receive nourishment 
and protection from birth,30 it is simply inevitable that 
the environment itself will have an immediate impact on 
us, and that situations in which we find ourselves in 
constant interaction with it will be perceived as friendly 
or dangerous, favourable or harmful, sweet and 
comforting or hostile and disturbing, embarrassing and 
annoying. For this reason, before you can postpone this 
impact, before you can plan or implement new 
strategies, by using what elements are available in a 
certain situation as means in view of further aims, you 
will experience these situations in terms of the way they 
directly operate on you, against you or for you. It is 
properly this aspect that Dewey identifies as the 
aesthetic or qualitative characterization of every 
experience. 
 
Aesthetic qualities are not descriptive and neutral, but in 
themselves revealing of the way in which our exchanges 
with the environment are carried out. In other words, 
they imply a primitive form of evaluation that is not 
cognitive but rather affective. This is exactly Dewey’s 
                                                 
29 J.P. Cometti has helped me recognize Darwin's deep 
influence on Dewey, which is not to be understood 
reductionistically, deterministically or teleologically. The 
basic point is not to start with entities conceived as fully 
possessing their properties, but to consider the 
emergence of certain characteristics from an organism's 
interactions with its environment. I would add that these 
characteristics are not to be understood as a set of 
properties, but as answer modalities, as behavioural 
habits.  
30 On this point see J. Dewey, Human Nature and 
Conduct, cit. 
point when he says that “Even such words as long and 
short, solid and hollow, still carry to all but those who 
are intellectually specialized, a moral and emotional 
connotation”.31 Our immediate experience has a sort of 
proto-evaluative extent; it implies rejection or 
acceptance, rejection or approval.  
 
In this context, even the alleged merely sensory or 
purely physical recording of a situation appears to be an 
abstraction. First of all, I will experience a certain 
situation as being warm and friendly, for example, and 
then, by returning analytically to my immediate 
experience, I will distinguish some aspects I can relate to 
specific perceptual channels or will investigate the 
physical or microphysical structure of the objects 
involved. But it must be clear that those aspects are the 
results of further operations, or of new experiences 
distinguishing the different phases of a past experience 
to solve a problematic or an indeterminate situation.32 
 
It should also be recognized that when I feel a certain 
environment to be hostile or comfortable, I do not 
consciously perceive it as a cognitive content: first of all I 
experience and feel something, and only then can I know 
it explicitly or reconsider it analytically and reflexively; 
but the point is that knowledge is not the only factor in 
play. For this reason Dewey constantly stresses that as 
long as our exchanges proceed normally, without any 
problems arising, there is no need to know “immediate 
qualities, sensory and significant” since they are “had”.33 
He always thundered against the so-called intellectual 
fallacy of providing interpretations of experience in 
exclusively or predominantly cognitive terms.34 
                                                 
31 J. Dewey, Art as Experience, cit., pp 21-22. 
32 R. Bernstein in his “Dewey’s Metaphysics of 
Experience” (in The Journal of Philosophy, 58/1 (1961), 
pp 5-14) observes that in Dewey “qualities are not 
limited to those which have been called sense qualities, 
or to primary and secondary qualities. There are tertiary 
qualities which are directly felt” (p. 7). 
33 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, cit., p. 202. 
34 See R. Bernstein (op. cit), insisting on this aspect (p. 6). 
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In philosophical discourse it is customary to speak about 
aesthetic ‘qualities’ as a noun. Dewey, who was very 
attentive to ordinary language habits, notes that in order 
to speak about how we experience the manner or tone 
of a certain interaction between our organism and its 
environment, we often use adjectives or adverbs. Life 
circumstances can be sweet or bitter, and this sort of 
affective tone tends to guide our behaviour, but it can be 
revised and corrected when things do not work. Yet, 
there are no abstract or material entities such as 
sweetness or bitterness, harmony or dissonance, which 
we could assign to life circumstances.  
  
This last remark brings me to my final point. It could be 
argued that, if aesthetic qualities have neither stable nor 
regular correlations with the allegedly physical or 
sensory substrate supporting them, then they are 
subjective, as are secondary qualities in our modern 
tradition. It seems that there is no way out of the 
alternative between subjectivist idealism and realism. 
Dewey, however, turns the problem around by arguing 
that when I feel a certain situation is difficult or a piece 
of music disturbing, I am neither finding a property of 
the situation or of the song, nor am I subjectively 
projecting my private impressions on the objects I am 
trying to cope with. I am rather perceiving a ‘real’ 
characteristic of my ongoing relation with these objects, 
which both tells me something about the environment I 
am facing and guides my behaviour within it. And to 
support this kind of non-dualistic position, Dewey has no 
need to become a pseudo-idealistic philosopher35; 
rather, he adopts a form of Darwinian naturalism and 
Jamesian empiricism. 
 
Experience is neither the reign of the subject nor 
objective reality. It is the open result of a reciprocal 
exchange between organisms and their environment, 
both of which contribute to making the world what it is, 
determining and modifying, and yet no activity can be 
                                                 
35 On this point see Bernstein’s criticism. 
considered the final one, capable of providing the world 
with all its supposed properties.36 Besides, as William 
James noted in his polemic against classical empiricism, 
radical empiricism must recognize the reality of 
relations; they are not a sort of secondary entity, derived 
from the association of atomic ones, but are realities 
that are immediately experienced, so that they “must be 
accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system”.37 
 
III. Against aesthetic asceticism 
 
I now come to the last part of my paper, which is 
devoted to the topic of “consummatory experience”, or 
the “consummatory phase” of experience, with a 
particular focus on the philosophical issue of enjoyment. 
In order to provide an idea of the typical continental 
disrepute of enjoyment, I shall begin by quoting a 
passage by Hans Robert Jauss, taken from an interesting 
chapter on pleasure in his book Aesthetic Experience and 
Literary Hermeneutics, which very clearly illustrates a 
certain kind of aesthetic asceticism we are used to: 
 
[…] Today aesthetic experience is mostly 
considered authentic only when it has left 
behind itself any pleasure and has raised itself to 
the level of aesthetic reflection. The most 
decisive criticism of every artistic experience 
based on enjoyment can be found, once again, in 
Adorno: whoever in art works searches and finds 
pleasure is a philistine, and “expressions like 
‘ears delight’ prove he is guilty”. Whoever is not 
able to free art from taste for pleasure places art 
near food and pornographic products. After all, 
aesthetic pleasure is nothing but a bourgeois 
reaction to the spiritualization of art and 
therefore it represents the basic assumption of 
the contemporary culture industry, which serves 
the vested interests of dominant powers 
managing the vicious circle of needs and 
satisfactions and using aesthetic surrogates. In 
short, we read in Adorno's Ästhetische Theorie: 
“The bourgeois wishes that art is thriving and life 
ascetic, but the opposite would be better”.38 
                                                 
36 See J. Dewey, Art as Experience, cit., p. 251.  
37 H. James, “A World of Pure Experience”, originally 
published in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Scientific Method, 1/20 (1904), pp 533-543. 
38 H.R. Jauss, Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische 
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Dewey’s approach to enjoyment, both life enjoyment 
and the specifically artistic ones, is very different.39 First 
of all we must remember that Dewey introduces the 
term “consummatory experience” in Art as Experience to 
characterize his concept of having an experience, that is 
in order to distinguish an experience that may be 
eminently artistic or aesthetic, but which more generally 
stands out from our inconclusive daily experiences, from 
ordinary interactions that mostly go further, leaving no 
trace and giving no satisfaction. Every human interaction 
with the natural and social environment will have a 
stronger or weaker immediate aesthetic quality, 
according to Dewey, because in the first instance our 
existence is structurally exposed to other human beings 
and to natural circumstances which can be comfortable 
or dangerous for us, which will make us suffer or enjoy. 
However, not every interaction with our world is 
brought to completion and becomes a “consummatory 
                                                                       
Hermeneutik (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1982), It. transl., p. 
95. 
39 The contrast between this typical aesthetic asceticism 
and Dewey’s approach was increased in my own national 
context by the Italian translation of both Art as 
Experience and Experience and Nature, which led to a 
misunderstanding on this point. In the two translations 
by Granese and Bairati “consummation” is rendered with 
“consumo”, that is “consumption”, and “consummatory 
experience” with “esperienza consumatoria”, that is 
“consumption experience”. I must confess that when I 
was reading these translations for the first time I was 
upset as, I imagine, every philosopher trained in the 
continental tradition must have been. This 
embarrassment is due to the fact that Dewey seems to 
argue that consumption was discovered by human being 
before identifying what is good and preparing the means 
to achieve it, or that what marks out a certain 
experience from most inconclusive comings and goings 
with our environment is the attainment of a form of 
consumption. Besides, associating artistic experience 
with consumption immediately triggers a sort of 
instinctive reaction in the average European 
philosopher, because a strong suspicion arises that what 
is being proposed is a new version of artistic 
enslavement to consumption, confirming the reduction 
of culture to an uncritical culture industry. In any case it 
must be noted that in his new Italian translation of Art as 
Experience Giovanni Matteucci chose “perfezionamento” 
for translating “consummation”, a term that is better 
connected to “fulfillment”, “compimento” in Italian, 
which is very often used by Dewey in related sentences. 
experience”. In the English language 'consummate' 
means to complete; in this sense, it means to bring a 
certain process to its perfection, for example a marriage 
through the consummation of the sexual act, a 
premeditated murder through its perpetration. 
‘Consummate’ is also used to talk about the culmination 
of a desire and the correlated efforts made to pursue it 
that is to fulfil it. 
 
Consummatory experiences are those experiences we 
can consciously appreciate for their completeness and 
capacity to enhance our lives. In Dewey’s opinion, these 
particularly include artistic and aesthetic experiences. 
Some scholars, such as George Mead, Jack Kaminsky and 
especially D.C. Mathur, have emphasized that the 
“consummatory phase” of an experience is the one 
leading to its fulfilment. As such, it lends the experience 
its unity and brings a certain relief from the tritest 
routines. In particular, according to Mathur’s 
reconstruction, in experiencing rhythm we could 
recognize a first phase of immediate quality of the 
experience of doing and undergoing, a further stage of 
reflective experience, where the involved organism 
reaches the awareness of doing and undergoing 
relations that are taking place, and a final consummatory 
phase, “which incorporates the significance and meaning 
of the reflective phase and is thereby rendered more 
rich and deepened in its immediacy”.40 Mead on his part, 
as I mentioned earlier, points out that an experience 
comes to its end not simply when a certain goal has 
been achieved, but when the pursuit of it does not 
preclude an appreciation of the means by which we tend 
to realize it, that is when we enjoy instrumental activities 
for themselves, therefore producing an enhancement of 
life. 
 
From this point of view it is clear that the distance is 
again very considerable with respect to the typical 
critical theory approach, which is essentially based on a 
                                                 
40 D.C.Mathur, cit., p. 226. 
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strong dualism between value rationality and 
instrumental rationality – a dualism Dewey constantly 
calls into question. 
 
In addition to these comments I would like to recall the 
natural context in which the American pragmatist 
introduced the idea of the consummatory phase of an 
experience, because from this point of view aesthetic 
needs appear to be basic anthropological traits we can 
answer more or less critically, but cannot simply 
neglect.41 Experiences in general can be fulfilled because 
we live in an unstable world and our existence depends 
on the constant exchanges occurring in our world. It is 
quite natural for interactions to have a rhythmic flow: 
organic and environmental energies have moments of 
instability and disequilibrium and moments of deeper 
integration or balance. And likewise it is quite natural for 
human organisms not only to pursue forms of 
equilibrium with their environment, but also to tend to 
enjoy it, as an opportunity for energetic enhancement. 
Abstractly denying these aesthetic needs, namely the 
need to enjoy and expand life interactions, means 
removing these interactions and uncritically displacing 
them into other objects and in other forms. 
 
Dewey notes how this point has serious implications 
especially in the artistic field. Closing the arts in 
museums, but also making their fruition the prerogative 
of just a few and precluding their enjoyment by the 
majority of people, may mean that most people have to 
search for mere surrogates. From Dewey's perspective 
these surrogates are not necessarily represented by the 
popular arts, jazz or the mass media, as Adorno 
suggested. On the contrary, an aesthetic surrogate may 
                                                 
41 See Abraham Kaplan’s “Introduction” to Art as 
Experience, in which he notes that Dewey’s philosophy 
of art is close to Aristotle's naturalistic biology. Both 
scholars conceive energy in biological terms, because 
“Dewey shares with Aristotle (who was also a naturalist 
in the biologist's sense) an awareness of the primacy in 
these domains of the developmental psychology of 
adaptive responses to the environment” (p. xvii). 
be found in any artistic practice that does not produce 
an intensification of the vital energies, but rather their 
impoverishment, dissipation or consumption. 
 
On the other hand, the typical trend in advanced 
industrial society of erasing enjoyment from daily work, 
of denying the opportunity for everybody to enjoy his 
own work results and the connected sense of fulfilment, 
produces a tendency to search for those pleasures, 
habitually denied in routine activities, in one’s private 
time, that is in time free from work, now merely 
perceived as fatigue.  
 
From this point of view, and perhaps with some surprise, 
we can find a certain affinity between Dewey and 
Herbert Marcuse, in contrast to Adorno’s opposition to 
all affirmative forms of art. Marcuse’s 1978 book The 
Aesthetic Dimension draws a close connection between a 
sort of biological naturalism and the demand for a fairer 
and happier society for everybody. Marcuse affirms that 
“Marxist theory has the least justification to ignore the 
metabolism between human being and nature” and that 
a classless society firstly requires the recognition of 
human desires and bodily needs, as well as “an organic 
development within the socio-historical”.42 
 
But we can find some interesting proximities in a paper 
written many years before, in 1938, entitled “On 
Hedonism”. First it should be recognized that hedonism 
was able to denounce the spiritualization and 
internalization of happiness, conceived as only possible 
in a non-material dimension. However the problem is 
that hedonism has claimed material or bodily 
approaches as the only legitimate form of access to 
happiness, without calling into question the assumption 
of its mostly private, personal and subjective 
characterization. But if happiness can have no place in 
                                                 
42 H. Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension. Toward a 
Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (Beacon Press, Boston, 
1978), p. 16 and p. 17. 
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relations between men in contemporary society, if 
happiness cannot be shared, then it “is restricted to the 
sphere of consumption”.43 Yet it is a sort of consumption 
that by seeking to satisfy human natural urges towards 
consummation produces an impoverishment of living 
energies rather than their enhancement. From Dewey’s 
point of view, in the current world the consummatory 
phases of experience are transformed into forms of 
mere consumption.44 
I shall conclude my paper with a quotation from 
Marcuse that will not fail to impress readers of Dewey’s 
Ethics. In his analysis of both emancipatory and 
regressive aspects of hedonism, the German philosopher 
asks: 
 
Does not happiness, with it immanent demand 
for increase and permanence, require that, 
within happiness itself, the isolation of 
individuals, the reification of human relations, 
and the contingency of gratification be done 
away with? Must not happiness become 
compatible with truth?45 
                                                 
43 H. Marcuse, “On Hedonism”, in Negations. Essays in 
Critical Theory (MayFlyBooks, London, 2009), p. 129. In 
the same volume see also “The Affirmative Character of 
Culture”. 
45 By formulating a pragmatist suggestion, however, we 
should perhaps begin to call into question our 
consolidated and regressive habit to consider 
consumption only as a form of energy dissipation, which 
inevitably tends to confirm the existing forms of 
economic power by exploiting our most urgent needs of 
immediate satisfaction. I am thinking here, for example, 
of ethically shrewd forms of consumption, where 
commodities can be enjoyed because of the 
environmental or social working conditions they 
contribute to improving or because they favour our 
bodily health or forms of wealth-sharing. 
45 H. Marcuse, “On hedonism”, cit., p. 129. 
